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and (2) more appropriate statistics
than the farebox ratio are available.
The Second Circuit
concluded that it was inappropriate
for the lower court to rule that there
would be a disparate impact on
minorities based upon the farebox
recovery ratio. The appellate court
reasoned that the ratio fails to
sufficiently represent the distinct
costs related to each system,
resulting in a skewed representation
of the subsidies allotted to the transit
agencies. The Second Circuit,
therefore, held that the Urban
League failed to make a prima facie
showing of disparate impact.
In the event that the
plaintiffs' prima facie case had
demonstrated a disparate impact, the
circuit court noted that the MTA
could have countered plaintiffs'

contentions by establishing that the
alleged discriminatory practice was
justifiable. The Second Circuit
concluded that the district court
erred when it found that the defendants had not shown a substantial
legitimate justification for the
challenged conduct. The MTA
contended that due to the subsidization of the commuter lines: suburban
riders would be encouraged not to
drive to the City, automobile
pollution and congestion in the City
would decrease, businesses would
find (re)locating in the City more
attractive, and an increase by the
additional pool of fare-paying
passengers to ride the NYCTA
system. The MTA and the State
argued commuter rails bring
numerous material benefits to the
riders of the NYCTA, thus showing
that the commuter lines' higher

degree of subsidization is justifiable.

Injunction inappropriate
remedy for alleged
violation
The Second Circuit also
concluded that the district court
erred in granting a preliminary
injunction to bar the fare increase.
The Second Circuit noted that the
plaintiffs' claim was based on
differing rates of subsidization
between the city and suburban
systems. Since no direct relationship
between the level of subsidization
and the fare rate necessarily exists,
an injunction blocking the fare
increase was an inappropriate
remedy. Therefore, the Second
Circuit reversed the district court's
order granting a preliminary
injunction and remanded the case for
further proceedings consistent with
its opinion.

Household exclusion in homeowner's insurance
policy inapplicable when policy is also for vehicle
insurance
by Wendy K. Davis

In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Brettman, 657
N.E.2d 70 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995), the Illinois Appellate
Court held that an Illinois statute preempted the application of "household exclusions" in homeowners' insurance policies when such exclusions appear in "vehicle
insurance" policies and where the policy would ordinarily have provided coverage for the injury.
On October 2, 1991, Nancy Brettman
("Brettman") was walking her bicycle across an intersection in Chicago when David Rozychi ("Rozychi"),
driving his car, collided with the bicycle. Brettman and
her children, who were being pulled in a carrier behind
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the bicycle, were injured. Brettman filed a complaint
against Rozychi on behalf of herself and the children,
seeking damages for the injuries they sustained in the
accident. In response, Rozychi filed a counterclaim
against Brettman seeking contribution based on her
alleged negligence in causing the injuries to the children.
At the time of the accident, Brettman was
insured under "Allstate Deluxe Plus Homeowner's
Policy." Based on the terms of her policy, Brettman
turned to Allstate to defend and indemnify her against
Rozychi's counterclaim, and the company began her
defense under a reservation of rights.
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However, Allstate subsequently ceased providing Brettman's defense and indemnification and sought a
declaratory judgment action against Brettman and her
children. Allstate contends that the homeowner's
insurance policy it issued to Brettman imposed no duty
on it to defend or indemnify her with respect to the
counterclaim by Rozychi due to the household exclusion. Brettman then filed her own motion for summary
judgment against Allstate. She contended that §
143.01(a) of the Illinois Insurance Code preempts the
household exclusion "where a third party sues for
contribution against a member of the injured person's
family." The trial court denied Allstate's motion, granted
Brettman's, and Allstate appealed.

Brettman argues for coverage of
counterclaim
The Allstate policy ordinarily indemnified
Brettman for liability arising from an accident covered
by the policy, providing that "Allstate will pay damages
which an insured person becomes legally obligated to
pay because of bodily injury or property damage arising
from an accident and covered by this part of the policy."
Allstate, however, contended that the policy
contained a "household exclusion" which excluded
coverage for "bodily injury to an insured person or
property damage to property owned by an insured
person whenever any benefit of this coverage would
accrue directly or indirectly to an insured person."
According to Allstate, the exclusion effectively precluded protection against Rozychi's contribution
counterclaim because an "insured person" includes any
relative of the named insured who is a member of the
named insured's household.
In response, Brettman argued that because
Rozychi sought contribution against her with respect to
her use of a bicycle-both parties agreed it was a nonmotorized vehicle, § 143.01(a) of the Illinois Insurance
Code ("the Code") barred application of the household
exclusion in the policy. Section 143.01 (a) preempts
application of household exclusions to vehicle insurance
policies and provides that "[a] provision in a policy of
vehicle insurance described in Section 4 excluding
coverage for bodily injury to members of the family of
the insured shall not be applicable when a third party
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acquires a right of contribution against a member of the
injured person's family."
Brettman argued that her homeowner's
insurance policy was actually a policy of "vehicle
insurance" under § 4 of the Code. Section 4 defines
"vehicle insurance" as "Insurance against any loss or
liability resulting from or incident to the ownership,
maintenance or use of any vehicle (motor or otherwise),
draft animal or aircraft."
It was undisputed that the coverage sought for
the counterclaim "was a claim for bodily injury which
would benefit the children who are insured persons
under the household exclusion" and that liability for the
counterclaim would be covered under the policy if it did
not contain the household exclusion. The issue before
the court was whether the Allstate homeowner's policy
issued to Brettman was a policy of vehicle insurance
and, therefore, subject to § 143.01(a) of the Code.
Brettman argued that the Allstate policy
contained vehicle liability coverage under certain
circumstances by way of the general motor vehicle
exclusion and, therefore, the policy was a policy of
vehicle insurance. As a result, she contended that §
143.01 (a) barred application of the household exclusion
clause. In response, Allstate asserted that § 143.01 (a)
applies to automobile insurance policies, offers limited
coverage for motorized vehicles, but does not apply to
policies that cover non-motorized vehicles. Allstate
contended that because the "vehicle" here was a bicycle
and the policy was not an automobile insurance policy,
this homeowner's insurance policy was not "a policy of
vehicle insurance under section 143.01(a)."
In support of its position, Allstate cited, but the
court was unpersuaded by, the reasoning of State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v.Holeczy, 504 N.E.2d 971 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1987). There, the court concluded that §
143.01 (a) did not bar application of a household
exclusion in a homeowner's policy when that policy
completely excludes any liability coverage for injured
arising "from any type of vehicle accident." In declining to apply the analysis of Holeczy, the court found that
the Holeczy policy, unlike Brettman's Allstate policy,
"completely excluded any liability coverage for physical
injury arising from any type of vehicle accident" and
limited protection to damage to the vehicle itself.
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Court finds homeowner's policy is a
policy of vehicle insurance
Brettman countered that the court should
follow the reasoning of the court in Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Eggermont., 535 N.E.2d 1047 (I11.App. Ct. 1989),
where the court held a household exclusion inapplicable
under § 143.01(a). Examining a policy and a household
exclusion almost identical to Brettman's, the Eggermont
court held that the policy was indeed one of vehicle
insurance because it contained a large number of
exceptions to its vehicle exclusion, and thereby provided
limited liability vehicle coverage. In addition, the court
found that the lawnmower which caused the injury was a
vehicle under § 4. Therefore, despite the fact that the
policy was entitled a "homeowner's policy," the
lawnmower was a vehicle, the policy was one of
"vehicle insurance," and the court applied § 143.01 (a).
Brettman's homeowner's policy included a

vehicle exclusion and exceptions to the exclusion
identical to those in Eggermont. Additionally, in both
Eggermont's and Brettman's policies, the Family
Liability Protection coverage section included a definition of an insured person intended for use in connection
with coverage of vehicles. The court in the present case
agreed with the court in Eggermont that the provisions
included in Brettman's policy suggested that the policy
contemplated coverage of vehicular liability, at least in
some circumstances.
The court held that the Allstate homeowner's
insurance policy issued to Brettman was a policy of
vehicle insurance and applied § 143.01(a), nullifying the
household exclusion. Consequently, household exclusions barring insurance coverage for physical or
property damages, when the benefits of the coverage
"would accrue directly or indirectly to an insured
person," are inapplicable under Illinois law, when the
policy is also one for vehicle insurance.

Associate attorney susceptible to suit by law firm
partner
by Michael Foster

In Kramer v. Nowak, 1995
WL 753857 (D. Pa.), the district
court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania recognized a cause of
action for negligence in representing
clients, brought by supervising
attorneys against subordinate
attorneys. Additionally, the court
held that dismissal of a contribution
claim for attorney malpractice is not
required, under the principle of
respondeatsuperior,based on
determination that the attorney
against whom contribution is sought
was in fact an employee and not an
independent contractor.
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Client unhappy with
award
While in his final semester
at Rutgers University Law School,
Jeffrey Nowak ("Nowark") was
hired by attorney Steven Kramer
("Kramer") to work on a large
antitrust case, Lightning Lube, Inc. v.
Witco Corp., 802 F. Supp. 1180
(D.N.J. 1992), then pending in
federal court. Upon admission to the
New Jersey bar, Nowak's name was
listed as an associate on the Kramer
firm's letterhead. For approximately
five years, Nowak worked out of
Lightning Lube's office in New
Jersey, all the while under the

direction of Kramer, from either his
New York or Philadelphia office.
Nowak prepared and submitted
numerous documents on behalf of
Kramer for Lightning Lube. Of
particular significance was a motion
for prejudgment interest in the
amount of four million dollars.
Lightning Lube eventually
prevailed in its litigation with Witco
Corporation but was dissatisfied
with the 11.5 million dollar judgement recovered. Lightning Lube
filed a malpractice suit against
Kramer alleging that his negligent
representation resulted in Lightning
Lube receiving a significantly
smaller judgment than merited by its
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